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Abstract. A three-way arms race can be modeled aa an iterated game with the payoff determined 
by the average performance over the psst. We show that there exists a robust rtrategy for any 
one player which cannot be exploited by the other playera, but for which mutual disarmament 
is a global attractor if the strategy is used by all three players. 
1. THE PAYOFF 
In his landmark paper on the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, Smale [2] defines the payoff at 
any step to be the average payoff over the entire past. In [l] it is pointed out that in an 
arms race mode1 it is more appropriate to compute the payoff from the average armament 
level. These are not equivalent, but we showed how Smale’s construction of a good strategy 
(to be defined b 1 e ow can be carried over to the arms race situation. In this paper we show ) 
how the results of [l] can be extended to model an arms race among three countries. 
The strategy space of the game will be the unit cube. The i-th player chooses qi, i = 1,2,3, 
0 5 qi 2 1. Here, 0 corresponds to some minima1 armament level, 1 to a maximal level. We 
need to define the payoff to the i - Ih player Iii(q), p = (ql,qz,qs). The payoff will be the 
security perceived by the player if the armament levels are given by q. One generalization of 
the 2-person arms race game is to have the payoff to player 1 satisfy the following inequalities: 
nl(l,o,o) > nl(o,o,o) > &(l,l,O) = &(l,O,l) > 
Hl(l, 1,l) > Hl(0, LO) = nl(o,o, 1)) > %(O, l,l>; 
and then define the other Iii by symmetry: 
Bz(Q, 4 c) := rIl(b,U,C), rI3(a,b,c) := rIl(C,b, a). 
This means that player 1 is most secure if he is armed and the others are disarmed, then 
he is less secure than that if all three are disarmed, less again if he is armed and exactly 
one of the other players is armed, then even less if all three are armed, and so on, with the 
least secure arrangement consisting of player 1 being disarmed and both the others armed. 
Note that if we restrict the game to the vertices of the cube then (l,l,l) is the minimax 
point and is a Nash equilibrium, that is, no one player can unilaterally improve his return. 
The Pareto-superior point is (O,O,O), which is not an equilibrium. These are features which 
characterize the twoplayer prisoner’s dilemma arms race game. There is no linear function 
III(q) sdisfyirrg ihe above inequaldies. There is a simple nonlinear function which satisfies 
the inequalities, namely, 
n,(q) = %l - qq2 + 43) + 2.5qzq3 + 5. 
There are of course many possible payoff functions, but this one is particularly sim- 
ple and has all the properties needed for the strategy we will propose. For this payoff 
we have IIi(l,O,O) = 7, IIi(O,O,O) = 5, IIi(l,O,l) = 3, IIi(l,l,l) = 1.5, IIi(O,l,O) = 
1, IIi(O,l, 1) = 0. Note that dIIi/dqi > 0, alIi/aqi < 0, : i = 2,3. 
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2. THE GAME 
The actual game consists of a sequence of armament decisions based on the payoff at the 
previous step. For n = 1,2, -. . , let 
9 
n+1 
= -&qn + -&. 
6 = (Jr,&,&) is the armament choice at the current step, with 6i = 0 or 1. Then q” is the 
armament averaged over the past. 
DEFINITION. An A-strategy is a function from the unit cube to {&I}. 
A player using an A-strategy S will take 
6 = S(q”). 
That is, he will base his play on the average armament levels of all the players. Suppose 
that player 1 is using an A-strategy. 
DEFINITION. An A-strategy S is a good strategy in the sense of Smale if it is: 
Attractive: If all players use S then (O,O,O) is a global attractor, i.e., lim,,,q” = (O,O, 0), 
for any q’, and therefore the optimal payoff 5 accrues to all players in the limit. 
Non - ezploitable: Since by playing 1 all the time a player can guarantee that he will do 
no worse than the minimax value IIr(1, 1,l) = 1.5, he must also have this guarantee if he 
chooses some other strategy. The best we can do here is to require 
liminfIIl(q”) 1 1.5, 
no matter what the other players do. 
Punishing: The other players should not be allowed to profit above the optimal value of 
5 by following some other course. Thus, we require 
limsup II, 5 5, i = 2,3. 
The main result is that there is a good strategy for this three player game. There are in 
fact many of them, but we will only give an example of one. 
THEOREM. There exist sets Ei, i = 1,2,3, such that the following A-strategy is good for 
player i: 
S: Play 1 if q” E Ei, play 0 otherwise. 
Proof: In everything that follows all sets are restricted to the unit cube. The set El 
wi=ist of the union of three sets. The first is the set of points q for which IIz(q) > 5. 
The second set is the set of points for which IIs > 5. The third set is one side of the plane 
tangent to the surface II1 = 1.5 at the point (1, l,l). This is defined by the inequality 
291 < 1.5(92 + 43) - 1. 
A very important property of El is 
q E El =+ 91 < mMq2,qd. 
This defines El. E2 and Es are defined by symmetry. 
We will give the main ideas of the proof that the above strategy is good. Observe first 
that ElnEznEs= 0. The next observation to make is that q E Ef =+ tq E E:, 0 < t 5 1. 
The set EP is defined by the intersection of three sets, one of which is obviously convex 
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and contains (O,O,O). Then, for the other sets, it is enough to show that if II,(q) 5 5 then 
l-I2(1q) 5 5. But 
rIz(tq) = l(rIz(q) - 5) + 2.5q1qs(tZ - t) + 5 I 5. 
We can now prove that the strategy is attractive. Suppose all three players use the strategy. 
By the above, at least one player chooses 0 for his play at each step. It follows easily (see 
[l], for example) that q? + q!j + q!j 2 2 + 3/n. If exactly two players are being exploited we 
may take q” E El rl Ez, q” E Ej. Then q; 5 q$ and q; 5 qg and 
Since 
we have 
Idi+’ - q:+‘l 5 maz( 
n+l IQ2 - qY+ll = *I& - Cl! 
A n+l 5 mar(nA” 
n+l 
-4 'n+l ’ (1) 
where A” = matijlqr - QI. If exactly one player is exploited, in which case IIi(q”) 5 5 for 
all i, take q” E El, q” E E$ n E$. If q; 2 60th qg and qg we still have eq. (1). The only 
other case is if qg 5 qy 5 q;. We still have eq. (1) if q;+’ stays between q,“+’ and qz+‘. If 
not, the only possibility is that q;+’ > both qt+’ and qi+‘. But for n sufficiently large we 
must be close to a point q for which q1 = q2 = t and 291 = l.S(q2 + 43) - 1. But then t = 1 
and since q!J 5 2 - 2t + 0(1/n), q” must have been in E3, which we assumed was not the 
case. Thus, eq. (1) holds for n sufficiently large. Therefore the sequence converges to the 
main diagonal but is bounded away from (1, 1,l). Now define the center of the cube to be 
the set Ef n E$ n E;. If for some n the iterate q” is in the center then for all larger n the 
iterates remain in the center and converge to (O,O,O). S ince the center contains the interior 
of the main diagonal in its interior, limq” = (O,O,O). 
To see that the strategy is punishing, suppose player 1 uses it. If for all n sufficiently large 
either II, > 5 or II,( 5, then limq: = 1 and clearly limsupIIi(q”) 5 5, i = 2,3. 
Thus, suppose that the iterates cross the surface II2 = 5 infinitely often. At each successive 
crossing II2 differs from 5 by 0(1/n). Subsequent iterations move toward the plane q1 = 1 
until they cross again. Let q be such that lIz(q) > 5, and let q(t) = (1 -t)q+lr, P = (1, t, y). 
Then the result follows from 
Indeed I *~z(q(t)lt=a = 5-&(q)+21-4(1+y)+2.5(yqi+qs(l-ql)) < -2+2.5q3(1-ql) =: 
h. But from the inequality II2 > 5 there follows the inequality q3 < (2-4q1)/(4-2.5ql) < .5, 
and therefore h < 0. 
To show that the strategy cannot be exploited, as before, we need only consider the case 
that the sequence of iterates crosses the plane defined by f(q) E 2ql - l.S(qz + 43) + 1 = 0 
infinitely often. Each successive crossing is within 0(1/n) of the plane. Then for any c > 0 
there exists no such that f(q”) > -e for n > no. Whenever f(q”) < 0, player 1 plays 1, and 
Q M’ will have the form q(t) = (l-t)q”+t(l,x,y), 0 5 (t,x,y) 5 1. Then f(q(t)) > -e. A 
simple computation shows that then lIl(q(t)) > 1.5 - c. 
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